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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4365 
 ___________ 
 
 SHARON DAVIS, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
CITY OF NEWARK; CITY OF NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT; ANTHONY F. 
AMBROSE, III, individually and under color of state law as Police Director for the City 
of Newark; IRVING BRADLEY, JR., individually and under color of state law as Police 
Chief for the City of Newark; LIEUTENANT JOHN SCOTT-BEY, individually and 
under color of state law as Captain for the City of Newark Police Department; ADOLPH 
VASQUEZ, individually and under color of state law as Sergeant for the City of Newark 
Police Department; JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-99, (fictitious names); XYZ 
CORPORATIONS 1-10, municipal or governmental entities and their supervisors, agents 
and employees 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 04-5317) 
 District Judge:  Garrett E. Brown Jr. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 9, 2011 
 Before:  BARRY, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed : March 10, 2011 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Sharon Davis appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her 
complaint.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s order.  See Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 672, 676 (3d Cir. 2010).  
For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
 Davis, an African-American female, was employed as a police officer with the 
Newark Police Department.  She filed a seven-count complaint against the City of 
Newark, the Police Department, and several individuals (collectively, “defendants”), 
alleging racial discrimination and impermissible retaliation under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD).  The 
District Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss all claims, and Davis appealed.  
We affirmed the District Court’s order as to all claims except those alleging retaliation; as 
to those claims, we reversed and remanded with instructions to address the claims in light 
of the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway 
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
 On remand, the District Court again dismissed Davis’s remaining claims.1
                                                 
1  The defendants framed their motions as seeking summary judgment, but the 
District Court, after noting that the defendants’ arguments focused on Davis’s complaint, 
treated them as motions to dismiss and did not consider any evidence extraneous to the 
pleadings.  We have explained that “[if] the district court dismisses an action for failure 
to state a claim on the face of the pleadings on a motion for summary judgment, a motion 
  The 
Court considered each of Davis’s allegations of retaliation, and concluded that she had 
failed to state a prima facie case.   
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 We agree with the District Court’s analysis of Davis’s claims.  To establish a 
prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII or the NJLAD, Davis must plead (1) that 
she engaged in a protected activity; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action; 
and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action.  See Abramson v. William Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 
2001).   
 Most critical to this case is the first element.  As relevant here, Title VII2
                                                                                                                                                             
so decided is functionally equivalent to a motion to dismiss and we must review it 
accordingly.”  Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1990).  Accordingly, we will 
accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe it in the light most 
favorable to Davis, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the 
complaint, Davis may be entitled to relief.  Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009).  Further, given that the District Court dismissed 
Davis’s complaint, it was appropriate to deny as moot her cross-motion for summary 
judgment.  See 10 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 2713 (3d ed. 2010) (“Of course, when a court decides to dismiss an action, 
on a voluntary or involuntary basis, pending motions for summary judgment against the 
claimant may be treated as moot and therefore not be decided.”); cf. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 444 (3d Cir. 1977). 
2  While this discussion focuses on Title VII, the same analysis applies to Davis’s 
NJLAD claim.  New Jersey courts “have frequently looked to case law under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for guidance in developing standards to govern the 
resolution of LAD claims.”  Carmona v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 915 A.2d 518, 528 (N.J. 
2007) (internal quotation marks, citation omitted).  To establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation under the NJLAD, Davis must plead both that she opposed a “a practice 
rendered unlawful” by the statute and that the employer knew about that opposition.  
Young v. Hobart W. Group, 897 A.2d 1063, 1073 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).  For 
the reasons discussed below, Davis has failed to make a prima facie case.   
 protects 
“those who oppose discrimination made unlawful by Title VII.”  Moore v. City of 
Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006).  Not every complaint or report entitles its 
author to protection from retaliation under Title VII.  See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 
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548 U.S. at 68 (noting that Title VII does not “set forth a general civility code for the 
American workplace” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Rather, only complaints about 
discrimination prohibited by Title VII — that is, discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 — constitute “protected 
activity.”  See Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 701-02 (3d Cir. 1995).  Thus, 
for a complaint to amount to “protected activity,” it must implicate an employment 
practice made illegal by Title VII.  See Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, 
Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2006).  General complaints of unfair treatment will 
not suffice.  See Barber, 68 F.3d at 702. 
 We agree with the District Court that, even accepting Davis’s allegations, she has 
failed to claim that she was retaliated against due to her complaints about conduct 
prohibited by Title VII.  For instance, she purportedly complained about certain 
violations of departmental regulations — such as Officer Colon’s transfer, officers’ 
smoking on site, and the practice of sending one-officer units to two-officer areas — but 
she does not claim that those complaints alleged the existence of unlawful discrimination.  
Similarly, her reports to supervisors about being called a “pain” did not ascribe the 
criticism to her race or gender.  She either did not identify any cause for the 
disparagement, or identified some cause that is outside Title VII’s ambit (as when she 
complained that Officer Reitemeyer had criticized her because she was being paid 
overtime for medical treatment).  Because Davis’s sundry complaints to her superiors 
failed to identify any conduct proscribed by Title VII, they do not amount to “protected 
activity,” and thus cannot form the basis for a retaliation claim  See, e.g., Sitar v. Ind. 
5 
 
DOT, 344 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 2003) (employee had not engaged in protected activity 
because she “complained only that she felt picked on, not that she was discriminated 
against ‘because of’ sex or gender, which is what Title VII requires”).  
 We note that while Davis has alleged stray incidents of race or gender 
discrimination, she has not made a prima facie case of retaliation with respect to any of 
those allegations.  For instance, she alleged that white male officers avoided working 
with her; she has not, however, claimed that she opposed that practice or that she was 
then retaliated against for her opposition.  See, e.g., Moore, 461 F.3d at 340-41.  Instead, 
those allegations appear to have been designed to support her hostile-work-environment 
claim, which has already been conclusively resolved against her.  Similarly, although 
Davis has argued at length that certain adverse actions that were allegedly taken against 
her are sufficient to make out a prima facie case pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. , these arguments do not 
address her complaint’s fundamental failing — that she failed to allege that she was 
retaliated against for engaging in “protected activity.”   
Accordingly, we perceive no error in the District Court’s conclusion that Davis 
failed to allege a prima facie case of retaliation under either Title VII or the NJLAD.  We 
will therefore affirm the District Court’s order dismissing her complaint.   
